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ABSTRACT
Studies of the effects of employment protection frequently examine protective legislation as a whole.
From a policy reform perspective, however, it is often critical to know which particular aspect of the
legislation is responsible for its observed effects. The American with Disabilities Act (ADA), a 1990
federal law covering over 40 million Americans, is a clear case in point. Several empirical studies
have suggested that the passage of the ADA reduced rather than increased employment opportunities
for individuals with disabilities. To the extent this is true, it is crucial to credibly disentangle the
different features of this complex and multi-faceted law. Separately evaluating the distinct aspects
of the ADA is important not only for determining how the law might best be reformed if some
aspects of it produce negative employment effects, but also for improving our understanding of the
potential consequences of ADA-like provisions in race and other civil rights laws. This paper
exploits state-level variation in pre-ADA legal regimes governing disability discrimination to
separately estimate the employment effects of each of the ADA's two primary substantive provisions.
We find strong evidence that the immediate post-enactment employment effects of the ADA are
attributable to its requirement of "reasonable accommodations" for disabled employees rather than
to its potential imposition of firing costs for such employees. Moreover, the pattern of the ADA's
effects across states suggests, contrary to widely discussed prior findings based on national-level
data, that declining disabled employment after the immediate post-ADA period reflects other factors











jprescott@stanfordalumni.orgI.   Introduction 
  A large literature examines the effects of employment protection on employment levels and other 
labor market outcomes for protected workers.  In much of this literature, “employment protection” is 
taken to be a simple unitary measure.  Thus, for instance, in studying the effects of employment 
protection on European and Asian unemployment, recent papers by Nickell (1997), Blanchard and 
Wolfers (2000), and Besley and Burgess (2004) measure the level of protection or labor regulation using 
single-dimension measures from OECD or other data sources.  Similarly, Oyer and Schaefer (2000) study 
the effects of employment protection on employment levels and other labor market outcomes in the 
United States by examining the overall effect of a multi-faceted antidiscrimination law, the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991.  In many areas, the fact that effects are identified from a single change in the legal regime 
means that there is no separate source of variation for identifying which particular components of the new 
regime may be primarily responsible for the observed effects; in other cases there are simply not enough 
sources of variation to disaggregate the separate components of “employment protection.”  Such 
limitations on the empirical findings are unfortunate, however, because it is difficult to evaluate potential 
policy reforms without an understanding of the specific sources of observed labor market effects. 
  The growing literature on the employment effects of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 
(ADA) is a clear case in point.  Several recent empirical studies have suggested that the ADA, a law that 
broadly regulates the treatment of individuals with disabilities in the workplace and elsewhere, has 
reduced the employment of individuals with disabilities (DeLeire 2000, 2003; Acemoglu and Angrist 
2001).  To the extent this is true—a closely debated question to which we will return in our empirical 
analysis—it is critical from a policy perspective to determine which specific features of the ADA may be 
primarily responsible for the negative employment effect.  While DeLeire (2003:259-60) suggests that 
those interested in improving disabled employment opportunities “should reconsider their support of the 
ADA as the vehicle for achieving that goal,” policy reform targeted to embracing and preserving the 
ADA—a law passed virtually unanimously by both houses of Congress and signed with enthusiasm by a 




 standpoint than policy reform premised on the broad conclusion that the ADA should be abandoned as a 
means of helping individuals with disabilities.  If empirical work on protective legislation such as the 
ADA is to have genuine policy relevance, it is critical to determine the specific source of the observed 
labor market effects of the legislation. 
Despite the voluminous literature on the employment effects of the ADA, the question of why the 
ADA might have a negative effect on disabled employment has received essentially no systematic 
empirical attention.  If the ADA’s provisions render individuals with disabilities more costly to employ 
but—because of the difficulty of enforcing prohibitions on discrimination in hiring (Donohue and 
Heckman 1991)—do not effectively prevent employers from refusing to hire these individuals in the first 
place, then it is unremarkable that the law could be found to reduce rather than increase disabled 
employment.  But almost no empirical attention has been devoted to the question of just why the ADA 
might increase the costs of, and thereby cause the disemployment of, individuals with disabilities. 
  Two central provisions of the ADA seem most likely to increase the cost of employing disabled 
individuals.  First, the ADA mandates that employers provide “reasonable accommodations” to 
individuals with disabilities—such as purchasing special equipment or altering workplace structures or 
procedures—unless such accommodations would create “undue hardship” for the employer.  Such 
mandated accommodations impose obvious costs, though the precise magnitude of these costs may be 
uncertain (Blanck 1996).  Second, by prohibiting discriminatory discharge on the basis of disability, the 
ADA creates “firing costs” associated with the employment of individuals with disabilities.  These costs 
reflect the anticipated expenses (litigation and otherwise) of terminating disabled employees even for 
lawful reasons; such costs arise because the legal system must now be convinced that the termination was 
not discriminatory.  Unlike prohibitions on discriminatory failure to hire, prohibitions on discriminatory 
termination are likely to give rise to a significant amount of litigation by employees (Donohue and 
Heckman 1991).  The ADA, in potentially generating these firing costs, parallels other civil rights 
statutes, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 




 the law has increased (contrary to the firing costs prediction) or decreased (consistent with the firing costs 
prediction) employment levels of protected workers (Chay 1998; Heckman and Payner 1989; Donohue 
and Siegelman 1991).  In light of the existing empirical uncertainty about the validity of the firing costs 
account, an empirical investigation of the role of firing costs under the ADA is an important next step in 
this literature. 
  Because the ADA imposed both a reasonable accommodations requirement and potential firing 
costs at the same time (upon its initial enactment), existing studies comparing disabled employment levels 
before and after the ADA—including the studies by DeLeire and by Acemoglu and Angrist—are not 
well-suited to separating out the effects of the ADA’s reasonable accommodations requirement and its 
potential imposition of firing costs.
1  The present study seeks to isolate and evaluate the two distinct 
explanations for reduced disabled employment after the ADA by exploiting the substantial state-level 
variation in disability discrimination regimes that existed prior to the ADA’s enactment.  During the pre-
ADA period, some states’ disability discrimination regimes tracked the ADA in both requiring reasonable 
accommodations for disabled workers and subjecting employers to a “traditional antidiscrimination 
prohibition” (forbidding discrimination on the basis of disability in hiring, firing, and terms and 
conditions of employment), with its associated firing costs.  During the same period, other states imposed 
traditional antidiscrimination prohibitions but departed from the eventual approach of the ADA in not 
requiring employers to make reasonable accommodations.  Finally, a third group of states imposed no 
limits whatever on private employers’ treatment of disabled workers in the pre-ADA period.  By 
separately evaluating the effects of the ADA—with its dual imposition of a reasonable accommodations 
requirement and a traditional antidiscrimination prohibition with its accompanying firing costs—on 





1 Acemoglu and Angrist briefly attempt to examine the issue of the relative role of the two distinct types of legal 
requirements by testing whether “separation rates” for disabled workers fell during the post-ADA period; they find 
no discernible effect on separation rates and therefore tentatively suggest that negative effects of the ADA may 
result primarily from the law’s reasonable accommodations requirement.  However, as Acemoglu and Angrist 
emphasize, the separation rate information is “plagued by considerable measurement error,” and this noise may 
explain their failure to find an effect of the ADA on separation rates.  In contrast to Acemoglu and Angrist, Baldwin 
and Schumacher (2002) find that the relative rate of involuntary job changes for disabled compared to nondisabled 
workers fell between 1990 and 1993, although again accuracy of measurement may be affecting these results.  
Overall, separation rate data does not seem to be a reliable way to disaggregate the employment effects of the 
ADA’s distinct provisions. disabled employment in each of these three distinct state groups, we are able to provide a measure of the 
relative importance of the ADA’s reasonable accommodations requirement and its traditional 
antidiscrimination prohibition in driving the disabled employment effects of the ADA’s enactment.   
  We estimate that in the years just after its enactment the ADA produced approximately a 10 
percent decline in disabled employment in states in which the law’s reasonable accommodations 
requirement was an innovation, compared to states in which a similar requirement existed at the state 
level prior to the ADA’s enactment.  By contrast, we consistently find little to no effect of the ADA’s 
enactment on disabled employment in states in which the law’s traditional antidiscrimination prohibition, 
with its associated firing costs, was an innovation, compared to states with similar preexisting 
prohibitions.  Our results therefore suggest that the reasonable accommodations requirement of the ADA, 
rather than its imposition of firing costs, played the central role in the ADA’s near-term employment 
effects. 
  The state-law variation in pre-ADA disability discrimination regimes not only allows us to 
disaggregate the relationship between the ADA’s enactment and post-ADA employment patterns, but also 
provides a new source of variation for probing the robustness of the causal relationship asserted by some 
studies between the ADA and the employment trends observed over the 1990s (DeLeire 2000, 2003; 
Acemoglu and Angrist 2001).  As the significant scholarly debate over the ADA’s employment effects, 
culminating in a recent book-length treatment by Dennis Stapleton and Richard Burkhauser (2003),  
clearly illustrates, a perennial concern with any study of outcomes before and after the implementation of 
a new federal program is that concurrent unmeasured changes other than the passage of the new law—
including shifts in the economic, social, and technological environment—may be the actual causes of the 
observed changes in outcomes.  Our research, by separately studying the effects of the ADA in those 
states that had similar regimes in place prior to the ADA’s enactment, in those states in which the ADA 
was an innovation only with respect to imposing a reasonable accommodations requirement, and in those 
states in which the ADA was a complete innovation, provides an important new lens on the voluminously 




 the 1990s (DeLeire 2000, 2003; Acemoglu and Angrist 2001; Stapleton, Houtenville and Goodman 2001; 
Bound and Waidmann 2002; Beegle and Stock 2003; Kruse and Schur 2003; Stapleton and Burkhauser 
2003).  Our results clearly support a causal relationship between the ADA and declines in disabled 
employment in the years immediately following the law’s enactment, but beyond that period our 
findings—contrary to the existing work by DeLeire and by Acemoglu and Angrist—indicate that disabled 
employment declines do not appear to be causally linked to the ADA.  In particular, while relative 
disabled employment was lower in those later years than in the period immediately before the ADA’s 
enactment, we find no difference in the employment reduction between states in which the ADA was and 
was not an innovation. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II describes the data used in our 
empirical analysis.  Section III presents our basic approach and results.  Section IV describes a variety of 
robustness checks.  Section V offers a concluding discussion. 
 
II.   Data  
A.  Pre-ADA State-Law Regimes 
Tables 1, 2, A1, and A2 report the results of our detailed legal research into state disability 
discrimination regimes prior to the ADA.  We rely on primary sources (the actual text of statutes and 
judicial decisions) and, as described in the tables, have traced statutory provisions through all of their pre-
ADA amendments and code sections.  We have also read all of the pre-ADA reported case law, which 
provides judicial interpretations of states’ statutory provisions, plus unreported case law available on 
Westlaw.  The judicial opinions turn out to be a crucial source for us because a number of states imposed 
reasonable accommodations requirements by judicial decision rather than by statutory provision, and 
because in a few states (most notably Michigan) case law holdings significantly illuminated the meaning 
of ambiguous or even conflicting statutory provisions that would otherwise have been read differently.     
As Tables 1 and 2 reveal, states in the pre-ADA period had varying statutory and judicial regimes 




 in mandating some form of traditional antidiscrimination prohibition (forbidding discrimination on the 
basis of disability in hiring, firing, and terms and conditions of employment), with its associated firing 
costs, but differed from the ADA in not imposing a reasonable accommodations requirement; these states 
are listed in Table 1, and we refer to them throughout as the “protection without accommodation” states.  
A second group of states, listed in Table 2, imposed substantive requirements parallel to those ultimately 
imposed by the ADA; we refer to these states as the “ADA-like” states.  Finally, a third group of states 
(consisting of Alabama, Arkansas, and Mississippi), which we term the “no protection” states, set no 
limits whatsoever on private employers’ treatment of disabled workers prior to the ADA’s enactment.  
We address below concerns that there are only three states in this group and that all of them are from the 
southern United States.
2  No states in the pre-ADA period imposed reasonable accommodations 
requirements without having traditional antidiscrimination prohibitions.
3   
  
B.  Disability Status and Other Individual Data 
  For the disability status of individuals—as well as for other variables such as employment levels 
and various demographic and other controls—we draw on the March Current Population Survey (CPS).  
Throughout, we refer to data by its year of observation (the year preceding the March survey), and we 
restrict attention to individuals aged 21 through 58.  Variables and summary statistics for the years 1988 
to 1998 are reported in Table 3.
  
                                                 
2 All three of the “no protection” states did appear to prohibit disability discrimination by public employers (akin to 
the employment provisions of the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973), but they did not prohibit such discrimination 
by private employers.  Naturally, given our interest in this paper in examining the effects of the ADA, we focus on 





3 Although this research is the first to employ a comprehensive dataset based on original legal sources for state-level 
disability discrimination regimes, other studies have made some use of data on these state-level regimes.  Acemoglu 
and Angrist (2001) briefly use state-law information as an instrument in their empirical analysis and, in so doing, 
restrict attention to a limited number of pre-ADA state-law regimes that provided for “misdemeanor charges or civil 
penalties” in the event of an employer violation.  We do not characterize state regimes along the dimension of 
whether or not such sanctions were available because the ordinary set of sanctions—money damages along with 
nonmonetary relief such as reinstatement—did not vary significantly across the 47 states with pre-ADA disability 
discrimination regimes.  Beegle and Stock (2003) also use state-law information in their empirical analysis and, 
instead of examining the ADA’s effect across states, examine the effects of the state-law enactments themselves; we 
discuss their approach and results at some length in section III below.   The CPS variable for disability requires some discussion.
4  The CPS definition of disability 
comes from the March income supplement and reflects the subject’s answer to the question, “Does 
[respondent] have a health problem or a disability which prevents him/her from working or which limits 
the kind or amount of work he/she can do?”  Under the ADA, meanwhile, an individual is disabled if he 
or she has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, has a record of 
such an impairment, or is regarded as having such an impairment.  An affirmative answer to the CPS 
question certainly does not map perfectly or even that closely onto the ADA’s definition of disability 
(Schwochau and Blanck 2000:299-300). 
The reasons that the CPS and ADA definitions may diverge are several.  First, individuals who 
answer the CPS question affirmatively may be incorrectly reporting health conditions or impairments that 
limit work—perhaps because they are unable to find work—and may not in fact be truly impaired (see 
Kreider and Pepper 2002).  Second, only certain types of genuine impairments that may limit work have 
been deemed by the Supreme Court to be covered by the ADA (Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471 
(1999)).  Third, alongside these respects in which the CPS measure may be broader than the ADA 
measure, the CPS measure may be narrower in not including those with a record of impairment or who 
are regarded as impaired, but who are not actually impaired.
5 
While the CPS measure would clearly provide a poor basis for some empirical conclusions—such 
as the absolute number of people protected by the ADA at a given point of time—the estimates we report 
are not vulnerable on this ground because our approach uses the CPS measure to assess changes in 
employment levels after the ADA’s enactment.  Burkhauser, Daly, Houtenville, and Nargis (2002) 
provide evidence from National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) data that employment changes over time 
for populations defined by work limitations (as under the CPS) are not significantly different from 
                                                 
4 Burkhauser and Daly (2002:219-20) describe varying approaches to the definition of disability.  As Acemoglu and 
Angrist (2001) note, while the CPS disability question seems to refer to the individual’s status at the time of the 
March survey, the question actually serves as a lead-in question for a series of questions about disability income in 





5 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) claims data (available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/ada.html) suggest that about 15 percent of EEOC claims under the ADA involve the 
“record” and “regarded as” prongs of the ADA’s disability definition. employment changes over time for populations defined by impairments (closer to the ADA’s approach).  
Thus, we think that the CPS disability question has enough overlap with the definition of disability under 
the ADA that studying how those who answer “yes” to the survey question were affected by the ADA in 
terms of their employment levels allows one to learn something important about the effects of the law on 
disabled employment.
6   
The most important potential concern with the use of the CPS measure of disability or, indeed, 
the use of any survey-based measure of disability for purposes of examining pre- and post-ADA 
employment levels of individuals with disabilities is that the ADA’s enactment could itself have altered 
the composition of the group responding “yes” to the disability survey question.  Kruse and Schur (2003) 
describe several routes by which the passage of the ADA could alter the nature of the group of individuals 
answering “yes” to a disability survey question such as the one in the CPS.  If such changes occurred, 
then apparent disemployment effects of the ADA could actually be effects of the law on the nature of the 
population being counted as disabled.  In section IV below, we closely examine the time trend in 
affirmative answers to the CPS disability question, and, consistent with prior work on the prospect of 
such composition bias (Acemoglu and Angrist 2001:935; Beegle and Stock 2003:855-56), we do not find 
evidence that compositional changes are driving our findings.
7 
 
III.  Empirical Approach and Results 
  The ADA was enacted in July of 1990, so throughout the empirical analysis we compare 
employment levels in two-year periods starting in 1990 to employment levels in the two-year period 
immediately preceding 1990.  Because the ADA did not go into effect until two years after its enactment, 
it is possible that effects lagged behind the 1990 enactment date; alternatively, the time immediately 
                                                 
6 In the future, the CPS is likely to include disability-related questions that map more closely onto the ADA’s 
definition (see Kruse and Hale 2003:6-9).  No matter how precise this information, however, it will obviously not be 
available for either the time period in which the ADA was passed or for the years prior to the ADA’s enactment.  In 
this light, use of the CPS measure from the pre-ADA and immediate post-ADA periods is a reasonable step in 





7 The CPS was redesigned between the 1993 and 1994 surveys, corresponding to observation years 1992 and 1993.  
Acemoglu and Angrist (2001:925, 951) offer analysis suggesting that the redesign does not materially affect an 
understanding of the ADA’s employment effects. following enactment might have witnessed the largest employment effects as employers in the “protection 
without accommodation” and “no protection” states—while facing new potential costs of employing 
disabled workers down the road—were not yet restricted by ADA (or ADA-like) provisions and thus 
could, for instance, discharge or refuse to hire someone because of the person’s need for reasonable 
accommodations without incurring any sort of legal risk during this period.  Extensive enactment-period 
media coverage of the ADA suggests that many managerial employees in fact learned of the ADA right at 
the point of its enactment.
8  With respect to our “pre-ADA” period of 1988-1989, because the ADA 
actually received widespread media coverage as early as the latter half of 1989—when the law was 
already widely anticipated—our use of 1988-1989 as the period against which to measure the law’s 
effects will, if anything, tend to bias our estimates against finding an effect of the ADA, as employers’ 
behavior conceivably could have been affected as early as the second half of 1989.
9 
 
A. Univariate  Results 
Mean employment levels across our three state groups provide a first view of the basic effect of 
the ADA’s reasonable accommodations requirement and its traditional antidiscrimination prohibition, 
with its associated firing costs, on disabled employment after the ADA’s enactment.  Table 4 reports the 
mean employment levels in weeks per year for disabled and nondisabled workers, before (1988-1989) and 
after (all subsequent pairs of years) the passage of the ADA, separately for each of our three state groups: 
the “protection without accommodation” group, containing states with traditional antidiscrimination 
                                                 





9 During the latter half of 1989, media sources frequently referred to the certain or virtually certain passage of the 
ADA the following year.  In the legal literature, for instance, Chatoff (1989) stated that the ADA “inevitably will” 
become law, while Gardner (1989) wrote that Congress “seems almost certain to enact” the ADA “in the very 
foreseeable future.”  In the popular media, Shapiro (1989) stated of the ADA that “President Bush . . . guaranteed 
the bill’s passage with his support,” while Calkins (1989) quoted a disability advocate’s confident declaration that 
“for the first time ever, people with disabilities will have civil rights protection under federal law equal to the 
protection already afforded to members of minority groups and to women.”   Of particular interest are industry 
periodicals targeted to employers and their managerial employees; in this category, Romeo (1989) reports in an 
article in Nation’s Restaurant News that at a meeting of the National Restaurant Association the “Americans with 
Disabilities Act was mentioned several times”; that a member of the Association’s Human Resources Committee 
stated that the law “will affect us in the very near future”; and that another Association official stated that the “ADA 
seems certain to pass.”  Similarly, an editorial entitled “Accommodating Disabled Workers in the Construction 
Industry,” published in October of 1989 in the Engineering News-Record, stated that passage of the ADA “seems 
certain to follow.”  prohibitions but no reasonable accommodations requirements prior to the ADA’s enactment; the “ADA-
like” group, with states that had both traditional antidiscrimination prohibitions and reasonable 
accommodations requirement prior to the ADA’s enactment; and the “no protection” group, containing 
states that imposed no restrictions on private employers’ treatment of disabled workers prior to the 
ADA’s enactment.  We use two-year windows before and after the change in the legal setting (similar to 
Katz 1998 and Autor, Donohue, and Schwab 2002).  
Table 4’s top panel compares disabled versus nondisabled employment levels before and after the 
ADA in “protection without accommodation” states with disabled versus nondisabled employment levels 
before and after the ADA in “ADA-like” states.  Because the absence or presence of a pre-ADA 
reasonable accommodations requirement is the dimension along which the two state groups differ, this 
first comparison provides a measure of the effect of the ADA’s imposition of a reasonable 
accommodations requirement.  As Table 4 shows, in “protection without accommodation” states, where 
the ADA’s reasonable accommodations requirement was an innovation, disabled employment declined by 
1.35 weeks per year in 1990-1991 compared to 1988-1989, while nondisabled employment showed a far 
smaller decline of 0.23 weeks per year; by contrast, in “ADA-like” states, in which the substantive 
requirements of the pre-ADA state-level regimes tracked those of the ADA, disabled employment 
actually increased by 0.83 weeks per year in 1990-1991 compared to 1988-1989, while nondisabled 
employment was virtually unchanged (a decline of 0.03 weeks per year).   
Taking the difference between the two within-state-group differences for 1990-1991 compared to 
1988-1989, the mean-based difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) estimate for the change in 
disabled employment generated by the imposition of a reasonable accommodations requirement is –1.98 
weeks per year (column 3 of Table 4).  Given the base number of weeks employed for disabled workers 
prior to the ADA’s enactment—16.25 in the “protection without accommodation” states and 18.22 in the 
“ADA-like” states—the drop of 1.98 weeks represents over a 10 percent decline in disabled employment.  
The evidence of declining relative disabled employment in “protection without accommodation” states 




 1994 and subsequent pairs of years—the first suggestion of a near-term but not long-term effect of the 
ADA.  We discuss this timing pattern in further detail below.  Notice the reassuring fact that in all of the 
near-term post-ADA comparisons, nondisabled employment—in contrast to disabled employment—is 
relatively stable between the pre- and post- ADA periods in both the “protection without accommodation” 
and the “ADA-like” states.   
The bottom panel of Table 4 compares “no protection” states, with no pre-ADA legal restrictions 
on private employers’ treatment of disabled workers, to “protection without accommodation” states, with 
only traditional antidiscrimination prohibitions prior to the ADA’s enactment.  This comparison thus 
provides a measure of the effect of imposing a traditional antidiscrimination prohibition (an innovation in 
the “no protection” states but not in the “protection without accommodation” states).  Our mean-based 
DDD estimate for the implementation of such a prohibition bounces between negative and positive over 
the 1990-1991 through 1997-1998 “after” periods and is always small in magnitude and statistically 
indistinguishable from zero.  The mean-based results in Table 4 provide a first suggestion that the ADA’s 
reasonable accommodations requirement, rather than its potential imposition of firing costs, is the main 
source of a near-term negative effect of the law on disabled employment.   
 
B. Regression  Framework 
Our regression analysis employs a straightforward DDD specification like that used, for example, 
in Gruber (1994) and Collins (2003).  All regressions take the form: 
  Yijt =   β0 + β1Xijt + β2ADAt + β3DISi + β4LPj + β5NPj + β6(ADAt * DISi)  
    + β7(ADAt * LPj) + β8(ADAt * NPj) + β9(DISi * LPj) + β10(DISi * NPj) 
    + β11(ADAt * DISi * LPj) + β12(ADAt * DISi * NPj),                               (1) 
where Y is weeks worked; i indexes individuals, j indexes states, and t indexes years; X is a vector of 
demographic and state-level economic characteristics; ADA is a dummy variable equal to 1 in the post-
ADA period; DIS is a dummy variable equal to 1 for disabled individuals; LP is a dummy variable equal 




 to the ADA’s enactment (the “protection without accommodation” state group); and NP is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 for states in the “no protection” state group.  The LP and NP dummy variables 
measure effects relative to those in the “ADA-like” group.
10   
The coefficients of interest in equation (1) are the coefficients on the triple interaction terms, 
ADAt * DISi * LPj and ADAt * DISi * NPj.  The coefficient β11 on the first of these terms measures the 
change between the pre- and post-ADA periods in disabled versus nondisabled outcomes in “protection 
without accommodation” states (those with traditional antidiscrimination prohibitions but no reasonable 
accommodations requirements prior to the ADA) relative to this same change in “ADA-like” states (those 
with both reasonable accommodations requirements and traditional antidiscrimination prohibitions prior 
to the ADA).  In other words, β11 tells us how relative disabled outcomes changed in states in which the 
ADA’s reasonable accommodations requirement, but not its traditional antidiscrimination prohibition, 
was new (the “protection without accommodation” group) compared to how these outcomes changed in 
states in which neither substantive requirement of the ADA was new (the “ADA-like” group).     
Our approach here does not assume that the enactment of the ADA made no difference at all in 
states that had substantively comparable pre-ADA protections (the “ADA-like” states); among other 
things the enactment of the federal statute made available Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) enforcement and altered other procedural aspects of pre-existing disability discrimination law, 
such as the availability of federal court adjudication (see generally Neuborne 1977), and these changes 
may have influenced disabled outcomes.  Effects of the federal regime that are identical across states are 
permissible within a DDD framework, although such effects cannot be identified.   





10 Instead of looking at such relative effects, one could examine separate effects within each of the three state 
groups.  In that model the coefficients of interest would be ADAt * DISi * LPj , ADAt * DISi * NPj , and ADAt * DISi 
* ADj , where AD is a dummy variable equal to 1 for states in the “ADA-like” group.  Table A3 reports results from 
specifications that omit ADAt * DISt and instead estimate the coefficient on ADAt * DISi * ADj.  In these 
specifications, the coefficients on ADAt * DISi * LPj and ADAt * DISi * NPj measure overall effects rather than 
effects relative to the “ADA-like” states.  Returning to the original specification reflected in equation (1), because 
there are three (nonoverlapping) groups of states in our study, several of the interactions between the dummy 
variables are always zero (in particular, LPj * NPj, ADAt * LPj * NPj, DISi * LPj * NPj, and ADAt * DISi * LPj * NPj), 
and thus these drop out of equation (1).  Of course, if the ADA had differential effects across the “protection without accommodation” and 
“ADA-like” groups for reasons unrelated to the substantive legal provisions in effect in these groups, then 
our estimate of β11 would pick up those additional effects along with the effect of imposing a reasonable 
accommodations requirement.  If, for example, states in the “ADA-like” group tended to be 
systematically more vigorous in accepting and enforcing civil rights claims brought by disabled 
individuals than states in the “protection without accommodation” group, then β11 would measure not 
only the effect of imposing a reasonable accommodations requirement but also the effect of 
supplementing moderate or limited enforcement of disability discrimination law in the “protection 
without accommodation” states with the more robust procedures provided by the ADA.  Any attempt to 
control directly for cross-state variation in pre-ADA enforcement behavior using the number of 
discrimination charges brought under the various state laws would be confounded by the significant 
endogeneity of charge rates and the employment level (our dependent variable).  Acemoglu and Angrist 
(2001) address this endogeneity issue in their use of discrimination charge data by instrumenting for state 
charge rates with a variable for whether the state had a particular type of pre-ADA disability 
discrimination law (one providing for “misdemeanor charges or civil penalties”), but that approach is not 
open to us here given the role the state-law information already plays in our analysis.   
Nonetheless, we think it is quite unlikely that our estimate of β11 will be picking up enforcement 
differences that could confound the effect on disabled employment of imposing a reasonable 
accommodations requirement.  The timing of the state-law enactments suggests that the “ADA-like” 
states are not the systematically more aggressive, pro-disabled-worker states; in most cases the states that 
had reasonable accommodations requirements prior to the ADA’s enactment were those that instituted 
disability discrimination regimes relatively late in the game, while the “protection without 
accommodation” states were those “early to the party” in protecting civil rights of disabled workers (see 
date columns in Tables 1 and 2).  Thus, if anything, our estimate of β11 will tend to understate the 




 requirement, given the most plausible direction of any pre-ADA enforcement differences between the two 
state groups. 
While β11 measures the effect of imposing a reasonable accommodations requirement, equation 
(1) also provides us with a direct measure of the effect of simultaneously imposing both a reasonable 
accommodations requirement and a traditional antidiscrimination prohibition.  The coefficient β12 
measures the change between the pre- and post-ADA periods in disabled versus nondisabled outcomes in 
“no protection” states (those with no pre-ADA restrictions on employers’ treatment of disabled workers) 
relative to this same change in “ADA-like” states, and the difference in legal regimes between those two 
groups is the absence (in the former) versus the presence (in the latter) of a reasonable accommodations 
requirement and a traditional antidiscrimination prohibition prior to the ADA.  Thus the difference in the 
two groups’ outcomes (β12) is a measure of the effect of imposing both of these provisions with the 
enactment of the ADA; it then follows that the difference β12 – β11, which is also reported in our tables, 
measures the effect of imposing just a traditional antidiscrimination prohibition.  
All of the regressions reported below contain controls for individual i’s age, race, sex, educational 
attainment, marital status, union membership, and receipt of disability benefits, and for the state 
unemployment rate (except where precluded by fixed effects, as noted below) and the interaction of 
disability with the state unemployment rate.  By the nature of the DDD methodology, our approach 
controls for national time trends in employment, the general effect of disability on employment, state-
group specific employment effects, and interactions of each of these factors with the others.  Many of our 
regressions also include state, year, and state*year fixed effects, although in those specifications we are 
unable to identify the effects of the state unemployment rate and of the ADAt, LPj, and NPj variables 
from above and their interactions with each other.  Importantly, because all of our regressions include the 
interaction of disability with the state unemployment rate, our approach controls for the possibility that 
individuals with disabilities may face especially poor employment prospects when unemployment rates 
are high—an important control given the early 1990s recession immediately following the ADA’s 





C. Regression  Results 
The top panel of Table 5 reports the results of the basic specification in equation (1).  Consistent 
with the findings in Table 4, the estimate for β11, the effect of imposing a reasonable accommodations 
requirement, is clearly negative for the post-ADA year pairs 1990-1991, 1991-1992, and 1992-1993, with 
estimates ranging from –1.54 to –2.51 weeks per year.  Thus, as before, imposing a reasonable 
accommodations requirement seems to produce in the neighborhood of a 10 percent decline in disabled 
employment in the near-term aftermath of the ADA’s enactment.  Meanwhile, again parallel to the results 
in Table 4, the estimate for β12 – β11, the effect of imposing a traditional antidiscrimination prohibition, 
over the post-ADA years 1990-1991, 1991-1992, and 1992-1993 is small in magnitude, inconsistent in 
sign, and never statistically significant.  Thus, our results once again suggest that the reasonable 
accommodations requirement of the ADA, rather than its traditional antidiscrimination prohibition, was 
the source of a short-term negative effect of the law on disabled employment.  The second panel in Table 
5 shows that our results are unchanged when state, year, and state*year fixed effects are included, and the 
top panel of Table A4 verifies that the results are unchanged when state, state*year, and state*disability 
fixed effects (to control for compositional changes) are included.   
Our basic finding of a significant negative employment effect of imposing a reasonable 
accommodations requirement contrasts with the conclusions of a recent paper by Beegle and Stock 
(2003), whose results also point in a direction opposite that of DeLeire (2000, 2003) and Acemoglu and 
Angrist (2001).  Beegle and Stock use Census data for 1970, 1980, and 1990 to study the effects of the 
enactment of state laws governing disability discrimination in the pre-ADA period (whereas we examine 
the effects of the ADA across different groups of states characterized by their varying pre-ADA legal 
regimes).  Beegle and Stock find no significant effect of the enactment of reasonable accommodations 
requirements (in contrast with our finding) and no significant effect of the enactment of disability 




   The difference between Beegle and Stock’s results and those of others (including us) is 
attributable, we think, to a combination of the relatively imprecise information on state laws used by 
Beegle and Stock and some features of their econometric approach.
11  Regarding information on state 
laws, as detailed above, we obtained information exclusively from primary sources and traced laws 
through all of their pre-ADA amendments and code provisions.  By contrast, Beegle and Stock rely on 
secondary sources, which in some cases prove to be inaccurate and in any event do not allow them to 
identify the year of a law’s enactment (just the year when the law is first referred to in the secondary 
source in question).  The imprecision in the information about state laws will affect Beegle and Stock’s 
empirical analysis when the dating errors cross decade markers, as they do in a number of cases.
12  This 
noise in the coding of the state-law explanatory variable will tend to bias estimates toward zero (see 
Autor, Donohue, and Schwab 2002:28), and this may help to explain the difference between Beegle and 
Stock’s findings and the results obtained by us, DeLeire, and Acemoglu and Angrist.  
                                                 
11 An additional difference between Beegle and Stock’s analysis and ours is that most of their regressions include 
year and disability*year fixed effects; incorporating disability*year fixed effects proves to have a dramatic effect on 
their results.  In our analysis, by contrast, the bottom panel of Table A4 shows that adding year and disability*year 
fixed effects to our basic specification has little effect on our results. 
12 For instance, Beegle and Stock, relying on a secondary source, state that Arkansas had a law, §20-14-303, 
prohibiting private sector disability discrimination by 1987.  However, this statute did not, in 1987, cover 
employment discrimination, although it did cover private sector discrimination in other areas, such as access to 
restaurants and other public places.  (The full text of the statute is available in the AR-STANN87 historical 
legislative database on Westlaw.)  In alphabetical order, other states that are incorrectly classified by Beegle and 
Stock in terms of the decade in which private sector employment discrimination laws relating to disability were 
enacted include Colorado, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Missouri, North Carolina, Oregon, and Rhode Island.  Of this 
group, Colorado and Louisiana are misclassified as to both the decade in which a traditional antidiscrimination 
prohibition was enacted and the decade in which a reasonable accommodations requirement was enacted; Missouri, 
North Carolina, and Rhode Island are misclassified as to the decade in which a traditional antidiscrimination 
prohibition was enacted; and Massachusetts and Oregon are incorrectly classified as to the decade in which a 






  Hotchkiss (2002) also makes some use of the pre-ADA state disability discrimination regimes, and differs from 
Beegle and Stock in relying on primary legislative materials rather than secondary sources.  However, she 
nonetheless incorrectly categorizes a substantial number of states, in many instances probably because a state statute 
prior in time to the one she located also regulated disability discrimination in employment; these errors may 
contribute to her finding of a limited effect of the ADA’s enactment across state groups.  States miscategorized by 
Hotchkiss, in terms of date of enactment, include Alaska, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, 
New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, and Virginia.  (In the case of Alaska, California, 
and South Dakota, Hotchkiss explicitly notes that “exact original coverage [is] not available.”)  Some of the dating 
errors will not affect Hotchkiss’s empirical results; she examines the effects of state laws enacted between 1981 and 
1991, and, thus, a dating error outside this period will not affect her results.  However, in the case of six states—
Alaska, Hawaii, Massachusetts, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Texas—the dating error affects the 
classification of states over the 1981-1991 period.   Apart from the imprecision in Beegle and Stock’s characterization of state-law regimes, their 
empirical methodology may be less well-suited than ours to pinning down accurately the employment 
effects of reasonable accommodations requirements and traditional antidiscrimination prohibitions 
imposed by disability discrimination law.  Beegle and Stock employ a framework in which some states 
have promulgated a particular law during a given time period while others have not, and in which changes 
in outcomes across the two groups of states are then compared.  In that setting, a risk always exists that 
adjustments in the relative labor market outcomes in the different states reflect not the policy shifts under 
study but rather some set of underlying state-level social or economic changes that simultaneously 
caused, or at least occurred contemporaneously with, the changes in the state laws (see Besley and Case 
2000).  As Beegle and Stock note, “[i]f laws were disproportionately passed in states where the disabled 
were [already] faring better, we would expect the laws to have smaller effects and our empirical results to 
underestimate the negative impact of the legislation (relative to random assignment of the laws, including 
states where the negative impact of the laws would be larger).”  Examining the enactment of the ADA 
against a background of a well-established diversity of state law, by contrast, reduces the concern about 
this sort of omitted-variables bias because there is less reason to fear that the degree to which the ADA 
was an innovation in a given state is correlated with state-specific social or economic changes, given that 
virtually all of the state laws in question were enacted well before the ADA (see Tables 1 and 2). 
Returning to our empirical results, the 93-94 through 97-98 columns of Table 5 show that in this 
period neither imposing a reasonable accommodations requirement nor imposing a traditional 
antidiscrimination prohibition had a statistically significant effect on disabled employment; estimates for 
β11 range from –0.60 to 0.70, while those for β12 – β11 range from –0.25 to 0.87.  In other words, 
beginning in 1993-1994 and going forward the ADA’s enactment had statistically indistinguishable 
effects across the three state groups.  What is especially striking about these later “post-ADA” years is 
that it is precisely in 1993-1994 that the estimated coefficient on the term ADAt*DISi, measuring the 
common effect of the ADA across states, becomes negative and statistically significant; therefore, from 




 magnitude across all three state-law regimes—a sharp contrast with the clear differential pattern, based on 
pre-ADA state legal regimes, in the early years after the ADA’s enactment.  The bottom panel of Table 5 
underlines the point by showing that in a specification that simply ignores state-law information entirely 
(by setting NPj = LPj = 0 in equation (1)), the estimated coefficients on ADAt*DISi in 1993-1994 and 
forward are quite similar to the estimated coefficients on these variables in the top and middle panels, in 
which the separate effects of being in the “protection without accommodation” and “no protection” state 
groups are not restricted to zero.   
Thus, our results for 1993-1994 and forward, while consistent with existing findings of a 
persistent decline in disabled employment over the 1990s relative to the pre-ADA period, reveal the 
absence of any link between the degree of employment effects in this later period and the degree to which 
the ADA was actually a legal innovation relative to pre-ADA state law.  Our findings appear to deny 
earlier studies attributing declining disabled employment in 1993-1994 and forward to the ADA’s 
enactment the obvious theoretical explanations for their conclusions, as we find no evidence that either 
the imposition of a reasonable accommodations requirement or the firing costs potentially associated with 
a traditional antidiscrimination prohibition can explain the decline in disabled employment in 1993-1994 
and forward.   
The juxtaposition of a clear state-group pattern, in a predictable direction, in the immediate post-
ADA period (through 1992-1993) and no state-group differences in the later years raises some questions 
about the longevity of any negative employment effects of the ADA.  It seems plausible in light of our 
findings that the apparent negative effect of the ADA on disabled employment in 1993-1994 and 
subsequent years reflects not the impact of the ADA itself but, rather, other contemporaneous changes 
disproportionately affecting individuals with disabilities.  Otherwise, it is not immediately clear why the 
magnitude of the disabled disemployment effect after the ADA (in 1993-1994 and forward) would have 
no relationship to the degree to which the ADA was a legal innovation in a given state, when such a 




 the ADA’s imposition of a reasonable accommodations requirement might have had only a short-term 
negative effect on disabled employment.   
 
D. Discussion 
  Our results indicate that in the near-term after the ADA’s enactment, the law’s reasonable 
accommodations requirement, but not its traditional antidiscrimination prohibition with its potential firing 
costs, had a significant negative effect on disabled employment.  The significant negative effect of the 
reasonable accommodations requirement on disabled employment in the period just after the ADA’s 
enactment may reflect the fact that many accommodations, including physical alterations to the workplace 
and modification of workplace policies, impose obvious but often one-time costs on employers – costs 
that may well have been exaggerated or particularly salient in employers’ minds just after the ADA’s 
enactment.
13  Employers might naturally have responded to such perceived costs by curtailing their hiring 
of disabled workers, particularly in the period between the ADA’s enactment and effective dates because 
in that period curtailed hiring on account of accommodation costs would not have been illegal in the 
states in which the ADA’s reasonable accommodations requirement was an innovation.  Further reasons 
that the effect of the ADA’s reasonable accommodations requirement on disabled employment could have 
been more negative in the short term than in the medium and long term include the ADA’s important 
symbolic effect and the resulting changes in attitudes over time; the possibility that reasonable 
accommodations could ultimately increase the flow of qualified disabled applicants following a short-
term reduction as disabled individuals responded to the ADA by pursuing more education (see Jolls 
2000); and declining accommodation costs in response to technological changes and judicial refinements 
of the ADA’s requirements.  The conclusion that the true employment effects of the ADA are short-term 





13 While some observers have pointed to evidence that accommodation costs may often be modest (Blanck 1996), 
measurement issues and skewed samples of accommodations suggest that relatively limited weight should be 
attached to such evidence (Stein 2000:1677).  In any event it is quite clear that some legally mandated 
accommodations—for instance, the need to hire readers for blind employees, as specified by federal regulations (see 
29 CFR § 1630.2(o))—are in fact extremely costly for employers. rather than permanent effects is consistent with Kirchner (1986), who emphasizes that the consequences 
of laws such as the ADA may differ significantly over different time horizons.
14 
 
IV. Further  Robustness  Checks 
  This section further probes the robustness of our basic finding in Tables 4 and 5 that in the years 
just after the ADA’s enactment, the imposition of the law’s reasonable accommodations requirement, but 
not its traditional antidiscrimination prohibition, produced a significant decline in disabled employment.  
We also examine the possible role of composition effects and preexisting state-group specific 
employment trends in our analysis. 
 
A.  Robustness to the Timing of State-Law Enactment 
The upper left-hand panel of Table 6 shows the results (for post-ADA years 1990-1991, 1991-
1992, and 1992-1993) of estimating the basic fixed-effects specification from the middle panel of Table 5 
on a subsample of observations from states in which the state-level pre-ADA disability discrimination 
regime was already in place prior to 1980.  We perform this check on the theory that these early 
enactors—which, as noted earlier, are predominantly “protection without accommodation” states—may 
have differed systematically in their degrees of “civil rights orientation,” and thus in their enforcement 
environments, from the later enactors.  The fact that in two of the three regressions the estimate of β11 
becomes even more negative than in Table 5 provides some support for our suggestion above that the 
estimates based on the full 50-state sample may actually understate the effect of imposing a reasonable 
accommodations requirement.  However, some degree of caution is warranted in interpreting these results 
because only three states in the “ADA-like” group (Colorado, Oregon and Washington) had their pre-
ADA regimes in place prior to 1980.  Subject to the caveat just noted, the robustness of our estimate of 





14 With respect to the short-term employment effects of the ADA’s reasonable accommodations requirement, a more 
positive account than the one given in the text is that negative employment effects were themselves reasonable 
accommodations to the scheduling needs of disabled workers (see Tolin and Patwell 2003).  Given that we observe 
declines in weeks worked, not hours worked per week, however, and that the decline is limited to the immediate 
post-ADA period, it seems difficult to view the negative employment effects as the fact, rather than the potential 
consequence, of mandated accommodation. β11 in a sample of states with more uniform enactment dates also responds to the possible concern that, if 
there are either lags or bursts in state law effectiveness shortly after a state law is put on the books, then 
our 50-state results could be confounded by the different average enactment dates across the “protection 
without accommodation” and “ADA-like” state groups.  Our estimate of β12  – β11, the effect of imposing 
a traditional antidiscrimination prohibition, is also quite stable across the broader (all states) and narrower 
(pre-1980 enactors only) samples. 
 
  B.   Robustness to Variation in Employer-Size Coverage Thresholds 
 
As shown in Tables 1 and 2, pre-ADA state legal regimes varied significantly in the numerical 
employer-size thresholds they established for coverage by the state legal regime.  To mitigate any concern 
with bias from these significantly varying thresholds, we re-estimated the basic fixed-effects specification 
from the middle panel of Table 5 using only observations from states with employer-size coverage 
thresholds of 15 employees (the ultimate ADA threshold) or higher.  (Only one state, Delaware, had a 
threshold of greater than 15 employees.)  Our results, reported in the upper right-hand panel of Table 6, 
again point to a negative effect of imposing a reasonable accommodations requirement and essentially no 
effect of imposing a traditional antidiscrimination prohibition.  The fact that controlling for variation in 
employer-size coverage thresholds does not affect our basic finding provides some further support for our 
earlier suggestion that “protection without accommodation” and “ADA-like” states are not differentially 
affected by the ADA’s enactment because of a difference in the general civil-rights orientation of these 
two state groups, as such a difference in general civil-rights orientation would probably tend to correlate 
at least to some degree with a more versus less aggressive approach to the coverage of small employers. 
 
C.    Robustness to Alternative Measures of Disability Benefits  
 
  At around the time the ADA was enacted, the generosity of federal disability benefits was 
increasing substantially (Bound and Waidmann 2002).  Higher disability benefit levels provide an 




 individuals’ need or desire for wage-based income.  The increase in the number of disabled individuals 
receiving disability benefits, as well as the decrease in weeks worked for individuals with disabilities, 
over the 1990s are readily apparent from the summary statistics reported in Table 3.  
While all of the regressions reported thus far contain controls for disability benefits, the shift in 
federal disability benefit levels is actually of less concern for our study than for prior studies that compare 
overall disabled employment outcomes before and after the ADA’s enactment (DeLeire 2000, 2003; 
Acemoglu and Angrist 2001) because our DDD framework examines disabled employment levels in one 
group of states relative to disabled employment levels in other state groups, and thus changes in federal 
benefits levels are not as likely to matter for our results.  Still, changes in federal disability benefits could 
affect our analysis if for some reason the resulting changes in disabled individuals’ need or desire for 
wage income (and thus their work incentives) differed systematically across our three state groups.  Autor 
and Duggan (2003), for instance, note that work incentives depend on the relationship between disability 
benefit levels and wages, and thus states experiencing smaller wage increases (or larger wage declines) 
would tend to have more individuals receiving federal disability benefits, and thus not seeking and 
obtaining employment, at any given federal level of these benefits.  If wage levels across states were for 
some reason correlated with pre-ADA state-law disability discrimination regimes, then the effects of 
changes in federal disability benefits generosity (mediated through the Autor-Duggan mechanism) might 
be captured by, and therefore bias, our results. 
    The regressions reported thus far control for disability benefits receipt using a dummy variable 
for whether individuals received federal disability benefits through either the Disability Insurance (DI) 
program or the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program.
15  Because, however, the measure of 
disability benefits receipt in the March CPS is not ideal, we perform additional robustness checks using 
state-level DI and SSI applications and receipts in the population from Social Security Administration 
records.  The lower panel of Table 6 reports the results of re-estimating the basic fixed-effects 





15 The CPS provides information on receipt of benefits from the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance 
(OASDI) and SSI programs.  However, because our sample does not include individuals 59 and older, OASDI 
benefits should be exclusively from the DI program. specification from the middle panel of Table 5 using, respectively, the percent of the state population 
receiving disability benefits interacted with the disability status dummy variable (left-hand panel) and the 
percent of the state population applying for disability benefits interacted with the disability status dummy 
variable (right-hand panel).  (Including state fixed effects means we cannot separately identify main 
effects of the new disability benefits variables.)   Our results for the effects of imposing a reasonable 
accommodations requirement versus a traditional antidiscrimination prohibition are, once again, quite 
consistent with our benchmark estimates from Table 5.    
 
  D.  Robustness to Variation in Economic Environment 
  As noted above, our basic specification controls for variation in states’ economic environments 
by including state unemployment rate and the interaction of disability and state unemployment rate.  
However, as a further check on the possibility that unobservable economic variation across states might 
be influencing our results, we re-estimated the basic fixed-effects specification from the middle panel of 
Table 5 without state unemployment rate information; if removing these controls does not affect our 
results, then it seems unlikely that further unobservable economic differences are playing an important 
role.  The results, shown in the upper panel of Table A5, are quite similar to those in the benchmark 
specification reported in Table 5. 
 
E. Geographic  Robustness 
We noted earlier that, while both the “protection without accommodation” and “ADA-like” 
groups are large and well-balanced across the country, the “no protection” group consists of only three 
states, all of which are from the southern United States (Alabama, Arkansas, and Mississippi).  Our 
estimate of the effect of the ADA’s reasonable accommodations requirement will not be affected by the 
limited geographic diversity of the “no protection” group because that effect is identified solely from the 
comparison of employment changes in the “protection without accommodation” group with similar 




 antidiscrimination prohibition, based on a comparison of “no protection” and “protection without 
accommodation” states, could be distorted by this aspect of the pre-ADA state legal landscape.  In 
particular, if some unobserved shock occurred in the southern region of the country between the pre- and 
post-ADA periods, and that shock differentially affected disabled and nondisabled workers, then our 
estimate of β12  – β11 could capture the effect of this unobserved shock in addition to any effect caused by 
the enactment of the ADA.   
A straightforward strategy to alleviate the concern about a possible “southern trend” is simply to 
re-estimate equation (1) on just the southern states from each of our three state groups.  The “protection 
without accommodation” group in this regression includes Georgia, Kentucky, South Carolina, and 
Tennessee, while the “ADA-like” group contains Louisiana and North Carolina.  (The “no protection” 
group is, as before, Alabama, Arkansas, and Mississippi.)  Although, not surprisingly, the precision of our 
estimates falls with the sharp reduction in sample size, the lower panel of Table A5 shows that the results 
of estimating the basic fixed-effects specification from the middle panel of Table 5 on the nine-state 
southern sample follow the same basic pattern as the results from the full 50-state sample.  
 
  F.  Composition of the Disabled Group 
  As noted earlier, an important question that arises with the use of a survey-based disability 
measure, such as the CPS measure used in our analysis, is the possibility of law-driven changes in the 
composition of the group answering the survey question affirmatively.  If the group of individuals 
identifying themselves as disabled in response to the CPS survey question changed in shape or size as a 
result of the ADA’s enactment, then measured changes in disabled employment levels between the pre- 
and post-ADA periods may capture differences in the nature of the group answering “yes” to the survey 
question rather than employer-side effects of the new legal regime.  Kruse and Schur (2003:49), for 
instance, find evidence from Survey of Income and Program Participation data of higher numbers of 
individuals reporting severe limitations in 1993 than in 1991, and it would not be surprising for those with 




 An important advantage of the framework we employ is that changes over time in the shape or 
size of the group of individuals identifying themselves as disabled in response to the CPS question will 
not affect our analysis unless these changes vary with the pre-ADA legal regime of the state in which an 
individual lives.  While nationwide changes certainly seem plausible, state-varying changes are less 
likely.  This is not to say that they are inconceivable, however; one obvious possibility is that legal reform 
may make disability more socially accepted and thus lead more people to identify themselves as disabled.  
If this were the case, then changes in disability identification with the ADA could be more substantial in 
states in which the ADA was a more significant innovation.   
For state-group specific changes in individuals’ identification as disabled to confound our results, 
one of three things would have to be the case.  First, significant innovation through the ADA in the 
“protection without accommodation” and “no protection” states could for some reason have made 
individuals with worse employment prospects than those who identified as disabled prior to the ADA 
more likely to identify themselves as disabled.  This could produce an apparent disemployment effect for 
disabled workers in the states in which the ADA was a significant innovation.  However, if anything one 
would think it would be those closest to the line between disability and nondisability, and thus those with 
relatively good employment prospects, who might switch from identifying as nondisabled to identifying 
as disabled in a state in which the ADA was a significant innovation (say because the innovation made 
disability more socially acceptable).  Put another way, it seems rather difficult to tell a story in which 
those who are severely limited switch from answering the CPS question “no” to answering it “yes” when 
the ADA constitutes a significant innovation in their state, while those who are less severely limited do 
not exhibit a similar change.
16 
The second possibility for a confounding effect on our results is that individuals with reasonably 
good employment prospects became less likely in the wake of significant legal innovation through the 
ADA in “protection without accommodation” or “no protection” states to identify themselves as disabled, 





16 Even if it is the case (as suggested by Kruse and Schur 2003:49) that the proportion of disabled individuals who 
report severe disabilities has increased on a nationwide basis in the post-ADA years, it is unclear how this effect 
could plausibly be correlated with the degree to which the ADA was a significant legal innovation in a given state. precisely because the reform helped them to obtain and retain jobs (see Kirchner 1986:83).  Again, this 
could produce an apparent disemployment effect for disabled workers in states in which the ADA was a 
significant innovation.  If the legal reform did lead to a decline in the reporting of disability, then the 
proportion of disabled individuals should either shrink or grow more slowly in “protection without 
accommodation” and “no protection” states than in “ADA-like” states.   Figure 1 graphs the proportion of 
disabled individuals over time across our three state groups from 1988 to 1998, while Figure 2 presents 
corresponding fourth-order polynomial trend lines.  Over this period it does not appear that disability rates 
declined in states in which the ADA was a significant innovation (states in the “protection without 
accommodation” and “no protection” groups) relative to the “ADA-like” states.  With respect to the “no 
protection” states, measuring changes between 1988 and the post-ADA years 1990-1993, Figure 1 shows 
that the proportion of individuals answering the CPS disability question affirmatively increased more in 
the “no protection” states than in the “ADA-like” states for year pairings 1988-1991 and 1988-1993, 
while this proportion increased more in the “ADA-like” states than the “no protection” states for year 
pairings 1988-1990 and 1988-1992.  With respect to the “protection without accommodation” states, 
meanwhile, Figure 1 reveals that over 1990 and 1991 (relative to 1988) the proportion of individuals 
answering the CPS disability question affirmatively increased more in the “ADA-like” states (implying 
slower growth in the “protection without accommodation” states); but precisely the same trend was 
apparent in 1989, even before the ADA was enacted.  In 1992 and 1993 (the other years in which we find 
a negative effect of the ADA on disabled employment in “protection without accommodation” states 
relative to “ADA-like” states), by contrast, Figure 1 shows that disability rates are virtually identical 
across the two state groups, as they also were in the 1988 start year. 
A final possibility with respect to the composition of the disabled group, suggested by the work 
of Autor and Duggan (2003), is that states in which the ADA was a significant legal innovation also for 
some reason happened to be states that were experiencing smaller wage increases or larger wage declines 
around the time of the ADA’s enactment; as described above, individuals in such states would both tend 




 to be employed (again to be eligible for federal disability benefits).  This effect could produce a spurious 
correlation between the ADA’s enactment and employment effects across states if for some reason state-
level wage changes were correlated with pre-ADA state disability discrimination regimes.  The regression 
results reported above (Tables 5 and 6), however, show that our results are robust to a range of controls 
for disability benefits receipts and applications.  In sum, although we cannot entirely rule out an effect on 
our results of changes in the composition of the group responding affirmatively to the CPS disability 
question, our basic finding of a negative near-term effect of the ADA’s reasonable accommodations 
requirement on disabled employment does not appear to be driven by such changes. 
 
G.  Preexisting State-Group Specific Trends in Disabled Employment  
  Our conclusion that declining disabled employment in “protection without accommodation” 
states relative to “ADA-like” states in the near-term post-ADA period reflects the ADA’s imposition of a 
reasonable accommodations requirement obviously rests on the premise that the observed pattern of 
effects did not predate the ADA “experiment.”  Figure 3 graphs disabled employment trends in the 
“protection without accommodation” and “ADA-like” states from 1987, the first observation year in 
which the general disability status question was asked in the CPS, to 1992, the last year in which disabled 
employment in the two state groups moved in significantly different ways.  (As the results reported above 
suggest, convergence between the two state groups began in 1993.  As the earlier results from Table 4 
also show, nondisabled employment was relatively stable in both state groups over the relevant period, so 
Figure 3 focuses on disabled employment.)  These data paint a reassuring picture in which disabled 
employment moved roughly in tandem across the two state groups prior to 1990 and then diverged 
markedly in 1990-1992 (see Figure 3).  A longer pre-ADA window would obviously be preferable, but 







 V. Conclusion 
 
  This paper uses pre-ADA state-law variation to disaggregate the disabled employment effects of 
the two central provisions of the ADA, its reasonable accommodations requirement and its traditional 
antidiscrimination prohibition with associated firing costs.  Our effort to disaggregate the ADA’s effects 
in this way reflects a desire to evaluate policy reforms more tailored and more politically realistic than the 
broadscale recommendation that the ADA be abandoned (see DeLeire 2003).  However, our empirical 
approach ultimately yielded a more profound challenge to the existing literature suggesting ongoing 
negative employment effects of the ADA.  Our results suggest that while the ADA’s reasonable 
accommodations requirement had a significant negative effect on disabled employment in the near-term 
after the ADA’s enactment, the law may well have had no causal link to the declines in disabled 
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Table 1:  Pre-ADA State Laws Prohibiting Disability Discrimination – 
“Protection Without Accommodation” States 
 
In the states listed in this table, pre-ADA statutory or judicial law imposed traditional antidiscrimination 



















† n/a  1 
California  Govt. 12940(a), 12994
* 1973
† n/a
 ‡ 5 
Connecticut 46a-60(a)(1)
* 1973
† n/a  3 
Florida 760.10(1)
* 1977 n/a  15 
Georgia 34-6A-4(a)  1981  n/a  15 
Hawaii 378-2(1)  1975
† n/a  1 
Illinois 68:1-103(Q),  2-102(A)
* 1971  n/a  15 
Indiana 22-9-1-3(l)  1975  n/a  6 
Kansas 44-1009(a)(1)  1974  n/a 4 
Kentucky 207.150(1)  1976  n/a  8 
Maine 5:4572(1)(A)  1973  n/a  1 
Maryland 49B:16(a)
* 1974 n/a  15 




* 1978  n/a  6 
Montana 49-2-303(a),  49-4-101
* 1974
† n/a  1 
Nebraska 48-1104  1973  n/a  15 
Nevada 613.330(1)  1971
† n/a  15 
New Hampshire  354-A:8(I)  1975  n/a  6 
New Jersey  10:5-4.1, -12(a), -29.1  1972
† n/a  1 
New York  Exec. 296(1)(a)  1974  n/a  4 
North Dakota  14-02.4-03  1983  n/a  10 
Ohio 4112.02(A)  1976  n/a  4 
Oklahoma 25:1302(A) 1981 n/a  15 
South Carolina  43-33-530  1983  n/a  1 
South Dakota  20-13-10, 23.7, 23.8  1986  n/a
‡ 1 
Tennessee 8-50-103(a) 1976
† n/a  n/a
b 




Utah 34-35-6(1)(a)(i)  1979  n/a  15 
West Virginia  5-11-9(a)(1)
* 1981  n/a  12 
 
*   Original statutory section differed from statutory section in effect immediately prior to the ADA:  See Table 
A1 for details. 
†   Substantive amendment(s) subsequent to adoption:  See Table A1 for details. 
‡   Potential ambiguity over the existence of a reasonable accommodations requirement:  See Table A2 for legal 
description and effect on our results of alternative characterizations. 
a   Number of employees, as of 1989.  The column lists the number of individuals a firm had to employ before it 
was subject to coverage by the state’s disability discrimination law. 








Table 2:  Pre-ADA State Laws Prohibiting Disability Discrimination –  
“ADA-Like” States 
 
In the states listed in this table, pre-ADA statutory or judicial law imposed both traditional 



















Arizona 41-1463(B)  1985  1985  15 
Colorado 24-34-402(1)(a)
* 1977  1977
b 1 
Delaware 19:723(b),  724(a), 724(e)(2)  1988  1988  20 
Idaho 67-5909(1)  1988  1988  10 
Iowa 601A.6(1)(a)
* 1972  1987
‡, c 4 
Louisiana 46:2254(A),  (C)  1980 1980  15 
Massachusetts 151B:4(16)
* 1972
† 1983  6 
Minnesota 363.03:1(2),  (6)  1973 1983
†, d 1 
New Mexico  28-1-7(A), (J)
* 1973
† 1983  4 
North Carolina  168A-4, 5(a)
* 1973
† 1985  15 
Oregon 659.425(1)  1973
† 1979  6 
Pennsylvania 43:955(a),  (b)  1974  1985
c 4 
Rhode Island  28-5-7(1)
* 1973
† 1986  4 
Vermont 21:495(a)(1),  495d(6)
* 1973  1981  1 
Virginia 51.5-41(A),  (C)
* 1975  1985 n/a
e 
Washington 49.60.180  1973  1978
c 8 




Wyoming 27-9-105(a),  (d)  1985 1985  2 
 
*   Original statutory section differed from statutory section in effect immediately prior to the ADA:  See Table 
A1 for details. 
†   Substantive amendment(s) subsequent to adoption:  See Table A1 for details. 
‡   Potential ambiguity over the timing of adoption of a reasonable accommodations requirement:  See Table A2 
for details. 
a   Number of employees, as of 1989.  The column lists the number of individuals a firm had to employ before it 
was subject to coverage by the state’s disability discrimination law. 
b   Statutory language is somewhat ambiguous but is clarified by an administrative regulation, 3 CCR 708-1, Rule 
60.2(C). 
c   Judicial interpretation:  Iowa—Cerro Gordo County Care Facility v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 401 N.W.2d 
192 (Iowa 1987); Pennsylvania—Jenks v. Avco Corp., 940 A.2d 912 (Pa. Super. 1985); Washington—Holland v. 
Boeing Co., 583 P.2d 621 (Wash. 1978).  In the case of Washington, the 1978 decision briefly mentions the 
existence of an administrative regulation requiring reasonable accommodations, but this regulation plays only a 
minor role in the court’s opinion.   
d   Applicable only to employers with 50 or more employees. 






           
         
Nondisabled 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
   Age 36.9 37.1 37.2 37.3 37.5 37.6 37.8 38.1 38.2 38.5 38.6
   White 87.8% 87.1% 87.0% 86.7% 86.1% 85.5% 84.3% 86.4% 86.3% 86.2% 86.3%
   Post-High School 44.5% 45.5% 45.8% 50.0% 51.8% 53.6% 54.3% 54.0% 54.4% 55.0% 55.6%
   Working 87.5% 87.4% 87.2% 87.1% 86.8% 87.0% 87.3% 87.6% 88.0% 88.3% 88.4%
   Weeks Worked 40.8 40.8 40.6 40.4 40.3 40.5 40.9 41.3 41.6 42.0 42.2
   Weekly Wage $397 $422 $433 $447 $462 $481 $508 $561 $572 $595 $625
   SSI/DI 1.32% 1.39% 1.38% 1.31% 1.54% 1.61% 1.66% 1.59% 1.60% 1.43% 1.27%
   Obs. 67,907 74,616 74,980 74,192 73,525 70,999 70,686 61,300 62,088 62,338 63,137
Disabled 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
   Age 42.5 42.5 42.2 42.2 42.1 42.6 43.0 43.2 43.2 43.8 44.0
   White 83.7% 83.5% 82.6% 83.5% 83.6% 81.0% 79.5% 80.8% 80.9% 82.0% 80.6%
   Post-High School 23.3% 23.6% 25.7% 28.5% 30.8% 31.3% 32.1% 32.9% 34.0% 34.9% 35.6%
   Working 45.0% 45.8% 43.4% 43.2% 42.7% 40.8% 40.8% 39.7% 40.2% 37.4% 36.6%
   Weeks Worked 16.4 17.2 15.9 15.9 15.8 15.1 14.7 14.8 15.0 14.0 13.8
   Weekly Wage $307 $308 $314 $335 $317 $347 $376 $435 $396 $366 $469
   SSI/DI 32.98% 31.67% 34.33% 35.29% 37.66% 38.55% 38.10% 40.24% 42.41% 45.07% 44.68%
   Obs. 4,396 4,884 5,025 5,100 5,311 5,307 5,336 4,680 4,775 4,655 4,579
  Table 3:  Descriptive Statistics
 
Notes:  Descriptive statistics are unweighted.  Data are for individuals aged 21-58 and are reported by observation year (the year preceding the survey).  
“SSI/DI” reflects the percentage of individuals who received federal disability benefits through either the Disability Insurance (DI) program or the 




      
88-89 90-91 91-92 92-93 93-94 94-95 95-96 96-97 97-98
  Protection Without Accommodation States
   Disabled workers 16.25 14.90 14.67 14.34 14.43 14.47 14.33 14.00 13.48
(0.29) (0.27) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.27) (0.28) (0.27) (0.27)
      Time Diff. -1.35 -1.57 -1.91 -1.82 -1.78 -1.92 -2.25 -2.77
(0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40)
   Nondisabled workers 40.68 40.45 40.23 40.19 40.48 40.94 41.26 41.64 42.02
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
      Time Diff. -0.23 -0.46 -0.49 -0.20 0.25 0.58 0.96 1.34
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
          Group-Time Diff. -1.12 -1.12 -1.42 -1.62 -2.03 -2.50 -3.21 -4.10
(0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.41)
  ADA-Like States
   Disabled workers 18.22 19.05 19.26 17.79 16.51 15.79 15.97 15.98 14.65
(0.43) (0.42) (0.42) (0.42) (0.40) (0.40) (0.42) (0.43) (0.43)
      Time Diff. 0.83 1.04 -0.43 -1.71 -2.43 -2.25 -2.24 -3.57
(0.60) (0.60) (0.60) (0.59) (0.59) (0.60) (0.61) (0.61)
   Nondisabled workers 41.50 41.47 41.48 41.75 42.04 42.36 42.55 42.81 43.04
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09)
      Time Diff. -0.03 -0.02 0.25 0.54 0.86 1.05 1.31 1.54
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
          Group-Time Diff. 0.86 1.05 -0.68 -2.25 -3.29 -3.30 -3.55 -5.11
(0.61) (0.61) (0.61) (0.60) (0.60) (0.61) (0.62) (0.62)
  Group-Time-State Diff. -1.98 -2.17 -0.74 0.62 1.26 0.80 0.35 1.00
(0.73) (0.73) (0.73) (0.72) (0.72) (0.74) (0.74) (0.74)
88-89 90-91 91-92 92-93 93-94 94-95 95-96 96-97 97-98
  No Protection States
   Disabled workers 12.19 10.40 11.39 11.11 10.57 11.58 11.41 10.64 10.70
(0.88) (0.81) (0.85) (0.84) (0.86) (0.93) (0.90) (0.91) (0.93)
      Time Diff. -1.79 -0.80 -1.08 -1.62 -0.61 -0.78 -1.55 -1.49
(1.19) (1.23) (1.22) (1.23) (1.28) (1.26) (1.26) (1.28)
   Nondisabled workers 39.89 39.96 40.22 40.34 40.75 41.01 41.55 41.94 42.03
(0.27) (0.26) (0.26) (0.27) (0.27) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28)
      Time Diff. 0.07 0.32 0.45 0.85 1.12 1.66 2.05 2.14
(0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.39) (0.39)
          Group-Time Diff. -1.85 -1.12 -1.53 -2.47 -1.73 -2.44 -3.60 -3.63
(1.25) (1.28) (1.27) (1.29) (1.33) (1.32) (1.32) (1.34)
  Protection Without Accommodation States
   Disabled workers 16.25 14.90 14.67 14.34 14.43 14.47 14.33 14.00 13.48
(0.29) (0.27) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.27) (0.28) (0.27) (0.27)
      Time Diff. -1.35 -1.57 -1.91 -1.82 -1.78 -1.92 -2.25 -2.77
(0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40)
   Nondisabled workers 40.68 40.45 40.23 40.19 40.48 40.94 41.26 41.64 42.02
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
      Time Diff. -0.23 -0.46 -0.49 -0.20 0.25 0.58 0.96 1.34
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
          Group-Time Diff. -1.12 -1.12 -1.42 -1.62 -2.03 -2.50 -3.21 -4.10
(0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.41)
  Group-Time-State Diff. -0.73 -0.01 -0.11 -0.85 0.30 0.06 -0.40 0.48
(1.31) (1.34) (1.33) (1.35) (1.39) (1.38) (1.38) (1.40)
  Table 4: Means Analysis by State, Time, and Disability Status
  “No Protection” States versus “Protection Without Accommodation” States
“Protection Without Accommodation” States versus “ADA-Like” States
   
Notes:  Means reflect average weeks worked by state group, category of worker (disabled versus nondisabled), and 
time period.  All estimates are weighted using CPS survey weights.  Standard errors are reported beneath mean 




     
1.23 1.67 0.51 -0.99 -1.92 -1.46 -1.23 -2.67
(0.63) (0.78) (0.51) (0.52) (0.49) (0.61) (0.70) (0.58)
[0.93] [0.96] [0.98] [0.88] [0.82] [0.92] [0.93] [0.88]
-2.14 -2.51 -1.54 -0.08 0.70 0.12 -0.60 0.02
(0.69) (0.73) (0.68) (0.76) (0.68) (0.79) (0.88) (0.74)
[1.07] [1.04] [1.10] [1.04] [0.98] [1.05] [1.07] [0.99]
-2.63 -1.96 -1.12 -0.37 1.57 0.44 -0.56 0.24
(0.86) (0.94) (0.87) (1.22) (1.44) (1.19) (0.87) (0.68)
[1.21] [1.24] [1.23] [1.19] [1.33] [1.30] [1.05] [1.07]
-0.49 0.55 0.42 -0.25 0.87 0.32 0.04 0.22
(0.71) (0.76) (0.96) (1.24) (1.38) (1.11) (0.80) (0.68)
[0.98] [0.57] [0.98] [1.00] [1.17] [1.07] [0.76] [0.82]
1.33 1.72 0.55 -0.96 -1.89 -1.41 -1.19 -2.68
(0.77) (0.82) (0.80) (0.69) (0.67) (0.77) (0.79) (0.74)
[0.59] [0.72] [0.43] [0.48] [0.48] [0.58] [0.70] [0.50]
-2.22 -2.56 -1.54 -0.06 0.76 0.14 -0.61 0.11
(0.84) (0.85) (0.88) (0.81) (0.79) (0.88) (0.89) (0.81)
[0.62] [0.63] [0.50] [0.64] [0.57] [0.69] [0.78] [0.58]
-2.76 -2.03 -1.17 -0.36 1.59 0.44 -0.55 0.27
(0.96) (1.07) (1.05) (1.06) (1.22) (1.21) (0.90) (0.90)
[0.66] [0.82] [0.79] [1.18] [1.49] [1.07] [0.78] [0.52]
-0.53 0.53 0.37 -0.30 0.83 0.29 0.06 0.16
(0.69) (0.65) (0.88) (0.94) (1.11) (1.05) (0.65) (0.68)
[0.44] [0.60] [0.85] [1.17] [1.42] [0.95] [0.57] [0.48]
-0.14 0.24 -0.29 -0.94 -1.29 -1.29 -1.65 -2.65
(0.39) (0.48) (0.47) (0.37) (0.34) (0.36) (0.38) (0.36)
[0.37] [0.53] [0.46] [0.36] [0.28] [0.32] [0.33] [0.33]
No. of Observations 292,562 291,149 286,796 283,860 274,988 265,866 266,478 266,838
96-97






Coeff. on ADA*DIS*NP – 
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*LP    
93-94 94-95 95-96
Specification with State,        






Coeff. on ADA*DIS*NP – 
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*LP    
Specification Omitting State-  
Law Variables, but Including 
State, Year, and State*Year 
Fixed Effects
90-91 91-92 92-93 93-94 94-95 95-96 96-97 97-98
97-98 96-97 95-96 94-95 Basic Specification 93-94 92-93 91-92 90-91





Notes:  The dependent variable is weeks worked per year.  The pre-ADA period is 1988-1989.  The post-ADA 
period is as stated.  Robust standard errors clustered on state-disability interactions are in parentheses below 
coefficient estimates, and robust standard errors clustered on state-disability-year interactions are in square 
brackets below coefficient estimates.  All regressions are OLS regressions, employ CPS survey weights, and 
include the individual control variables listed in the text plus controls for state unemployment rate (in regressions 
without state, year, and state*year fixed effects) and the interaction of disability and state unemployment rate.  See 
equation (1) for further details.  
2.95 2.65 -0.17 0.48 1.14 0.99
(1.29) (1.75) (2.17) (0.93) (0.73) (0.87)
[0.74] [1.99] [1.00] [1.25] [0.97] [0.70]
-3.80 -3.54 -1.07 -1.40 -2.47 -1.93
(1.37) (1.79) (2.25) (1.16) (0.99) (1.16)
[0.85] [2.02] [1.12] [1.39] [1.10] [1.11]
-4.38 -2.97 -0.43 -1.93 -1.52 -1.62
(1.41) (1.88) (2.27) (1.11) (1.02) (1.11)
[0.79] [2.03] [1.20] [1.30] [1.07] [0.98]
-0.58 0.58 0.64 -0.53 0.95 0.31
(0.70) (0.86) (0.97) (0.93) (1.00) (1.04)
[0.48] [0.66] [0.96] [0.71] [0.75] [1.11]
No. of Observations 192,885 191,815 188,956 No. of Observations 93,566 92,864 91,464
1.00 1.28 0.68 1.45 1.95 1.23
(0.78) (0.85) (0.85) (0.79) (0.86) (0.88)
[0.70] [0.81] [0.59] [0.69] [0.81] [0.68]
-2.03 -2.41 -1.43 -1.78 -1.99 -0.92
(0.88) (0.90) (0.91) (0.87) (0.88) (0.91)
[0.76] [0.74] [0.54] [0.76] [0.74] [0.62]
-2.54 -1.55 -0.01 -1.82 -0.68 0.93
(1.61) (1.67) (1.38) (1.87) (1.89) (1.67)
[0.75] [0.81] [0.79] [0.81] [0.79] [1.01]
0.50 0.86 1.42 -0.03 1.31 1.85
(1.46) (1.52) (1.23) (1.73) (1.77) (1.57)
[0.43] [0.53] [0.74] [0.55] [0.67] [1.00]
No. of Observations 292,562 291,149 286,796 No. of Observations 292,562 291,149 286,796
92-93
Coeff. on ADA*DIS Coeff. on ADA*DIS
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*LP Coeff. on ADA*DIS*LP
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*NP Coeff. on ADA*DIS*NP
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*NP – 
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*LP    
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*NP – 
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*LP    
   (3)  Specification with State-Level Disability    
Benefits Receipt Information
      (4)  Specification with State-Level Disability 
Benefits Application Information 
90-91 91-92 92-93 90-91 91-92
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*NP
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*NP – 
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*LP    
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*NP
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*NP – 






Table 6:  Robustness Checks
(1)  Sample Includes Only Observations         
from Pre-1980 Enactors
   (2)  Sample Includes Only Observations from   
High-Employer-Size-Threshold States
90-91 91-92 92-93 90-91 91-92
   
Notes:  The dependent variable is weeks worked per year.  The pre-ADA period is 1988-1989.  The post-ADA period is 
as stated.  Robust standard errors clustered on state-disability interactions are in parentheses below coefficient 
estimates, and robust standard errors clustered on state-disability-year interactions are in square brackets below 
coefficient estimates.  All regressions are OLS regressions, employ CPS survey weights, and include state, year, and 
state*year fixed effects.  Control variables are as stated in Table 5.  In the upper panel of the present table, columns (1)-
(3) use observations from states in which the state-level pre-ADA disability discrimination regime was in place prior to 
1980; columns (4)-(6) use observations from states with ADA-like employer-size thresholds.  See Tables 1 and 2 for 
details on employer-size thresholds; observations from Tennessee and Virginia, whose pre-ADA statutory and judicial 
law did not specify an employer-size threshold, are not included in the samples used in column (4)-(6).  In the lower 
panel, columns (1)-(3) replace individual receipt of disability benefits with the percent of the state population receiving 
disability benefits interacted with disability status; columns (4)-(6) replace individual receipt of disability benefits with 
the percent of the state population applying for disability benefits interacted with disability status.  Fixed effects 
included in these regressions preclude inclusion of the percent of the state population receiving or applying for 






        

























   
Figure 2:  Percentage of Individuals Reporting Disability 



































Figure 3: "ADA-Like" and "Protection Without Accommodation"
State Disabled Employment Trends















1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Year
  
Figure 4: "ADA-Like" and "Protection Without Accommodation" 


























Table A1:  Pre-ADA State Laws Prohibiting Disability Discrimination by  
Private Employers – Original Statutory Sections and Substantive  
Pre-ADA Amendments 
 












Alaska  18.80.220(1)  1987  Broadened coverage to mental as well 
as physical disability 
California  Lab. 1420(a)  1975  Broadened coverage to “medical 
conditions” as well as physical 
disability 
Connecticut  31-126(a) 1978;  1979  Broadened coverage to mental 
retardation (1978) and mental disorders 
(1979) as well as physical disability 
Florida  13-261(1) 
(later 23.167(1)) 
n/a n/a 
Hawaii  n/a  1981  Broadened scope of liability 
Illinois  38:65-23(1) (later 48-
853-3(a)) 
n/a n/a 
Maryland  49B:19(a) n/a  n/a 
Michigan  n/a  1980  Broadened scope of liability 
Missouri  296.020(1) n/a  n/a 
Montana  1974 S.L. ch. 77, sec. 3 
(later 64-306(a)) 
1975  Broadened coverage to mental as well 
as physical disability and broadened 
scope of liability 
Nevada  n/a 1973;  1981  Added protection for use of guide dogs 
(1973); broadened coverage to “aural” 
as well as “physical” and “visual” 
handicaps (1981) 
New Jersey  n/a 1978  Broadened coverage to mental as well 
as physical disability and broadened 
scope of liability 
Tennessee  n/a 1986;  1987  Broadened scope of liability (1986); 
corrected omission of private employers 
from 1986 amendment (1987) 
Texas  Art. 4419e(f) (later Hum. 
Res. Code 121.003(f)) 
1983  Broadened scope of liability 
West Virginia  5-11-9(a) n/a  n/a 
 






Table A1 (Continued):  Pre-ADA State Laws Prohibiting Disability Discrimination by 
Private Employers – Original Statutory Sections and Substantive  
Pre-ADA Amendments 
 
Substantive Pre-ADA Amendments  “ADA-Like” 
States 
Original Statutory 




Colorado  24-34-306(1)(a) n/a  n/a 
Iowa  105A.7(1)(a) n/a  n/a 
Massachusetts  149:24K  1983  Broadened scope of liability 
Minnesota  n/a 1987;  1989  Altered definition of “undue hardship” 
(1987); refined definition of 
reasonable accommodations (1989) 
New Mexico  4-33-7(A) 1987  Broadened coverage to “medical 
conditions” as well as physical and 
mental disabilities 
North Carolina  168-6 1985  Made various revisions to liability 
provisions 
Oregon  n/a  1979  Broadened scope of liability 
Rhode Island  28-5-7(A) 1981  Broadened coverage to mental as well 
as physical disability 
Vermont  21:498(a) n/a  n/a 
Virginia  40.1-28.7 (later 51.01-
41(A),(C)) 
n/a n/a 
Wisconsin  111.32(5)(a), 111.36(4) 
(later 111.325) 
1967; 1975; 1981  Rephrased and clarified prohibitions 
(1967, 1975, 1981) 
 
Notes: The original statutory section often differs from the source reported in Tables 1 and 2 because states 
frequently renumbered their statutes in this period.  The substantive amendments reported in this table are 
amendments to pre-ADA statutory sections imposing traditional antidiscrimination prohibitions or reasonable 
accommodations requirements, and do not reflect changes in other statutory sections of states’ disability 






Table A2:  Effects of Alternative Characterizations of Pre-ADA State Laws  
Prohibiting Disability Discrimination by Private Employers 
 
State Legal  Description  Effect on Results for Post-ADA  
Years 90-91, 91-92, and 92-93 
California  Prior to 1981, Cal. Govt. § 12994 expressly 
stated that accommodations were not required.  
In 1981, the section was amended to provide that 
an employer shall not be required “to make any 
accommodation for an employee who has a 
physical handicap that would produce undue 
hardship to the employer.”  There is no pre-ADA 
caselaw indicating whether the 1981 amendment 
was meant to impose affirmatively a requirement 
of reasonable accommodations unless such 
accommodations would be an undue hardship.   
Categorizing California as an “ADA-like” state, 
rather than a “protection without accommodation” 
state, does not alter the basic pattern of our results.  
Our estimates of β11 (the effect of imposing a 
reasonable accommodations requirement) are 
somewhat smaller in magnitude and slightly less 
precise.  Our estimates of β12 – β11 (the effect of 
imposing a traditional antidiscrimination provision) 
remain insignificant in all years. 
Delaware  Law prohibiting disability discrimination by 
private employers was not enacted until 1988. 
Categorizing Delaware as a “no protection” state, 
rather than an “ADA-like” state, has virtually no 
effect on our estimates of β11 (the effect of imposing 
a reasonable accommodations requirement).  Our 
estimates of β12 – β11 (the effect of imposing a 
traditional antidiscrimination provision) remain 
insignificant in all years. 
Idaho  Law prohibiting disability discrimination by 
private employers was not enacted until 1988, 
and the statutory language is somewhat 
ambiguous as to the existence of a reasonable 
accommodations requirement. 
Categorizing Idaho as a “no protection” state or a 
“protection without accommodation” state, rather 
than an “ADA-like” state, has virtually no effect on 
our estimates of β11 (the effect of imposing a 
reasonable accommodations requirement).  Our 
estimates of β12 – β11 (the effect of imposing a 
traditional antidiscrimination provision) remain 
insignificant in all years. 
Iowa  The Iowa Supreme Court adopted a reasonable 
accommodations requirement in 1987 as a 
freestanding interpretation of the statutory 
language, but earlier courts had mentioned and 
applied administrative regulations requiring 
reasonable accommodations.   
This change cannot affect our results (because the 
timing of state law adoption does not enter into our 
categorization of states). 
Michigan  Limited accommodation provision, not expressly 
requiring reasonable accommodations, was 
adopted in 1976.  Administrative decisional law, 
summarized in Wardlow v. Great Lakes Express 
Co., 339 N.W.2d 670 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983), 
adopted a reasonable accommodations 
requirement, but in 1986 the Michigan Supreme 
Court, in Carr v. General Motors Corp., 389 
N.W.2d 686 (Mich. 1986), adopted a conception 
of the Michigan statute inconsistent with the 
administrative decisional law’s reasonable 
accommodations requirement. 
Categorizing Michigan as an “ADA-like” state, 
rather than a “protection without accommodation” 
state, reduces the absolute magnitude of our 
estimates of β11 (the effect of imposing a reasonable 
accommodations requirement) by about 10%, while 
the precision of the estimates generally improves.  
Our estimates of β12 – β11 (the effect of imposing a 
traditional antidiscrimination provision) remain 
insignificant in all years. 
 






Table A2 (continued):  Effects of Alternative Characterizations of Pre-ADA State Laws 
Prohibiting Disability Discrimination by Private Employers 
 
State Legal  Description  Effect on Results for Post-ADA  
Years 90-91, 91-92, and 92-93 
Pennsylvania  Pennsylvania’s reasonable accommodations 
requirement was imposed only by an 
intermediate court, rather than by the state’s 
highest court.   
 
Categorizing Pennsylvania as a “protection without 
accommodation” state, rather than an “ADA-like” 
state, does not alter the basic pattern of our results.  
Our estimates of β11 (the effect of imposing a 
reasonable accommodations requirement) are 
somewhat smaller in magnitude and slightly less 
precise.  Our estimates of β12 – β11 (the effect of 
imposing a traditional antidiscrimination provision) 
remain insignificant in all years. 
South Dakota  Limited accommodation provision, not expressly 
requiring reasonable accommodations, was 
adopted in 1986.   
Categorizing South Dakota as an “ADA-like” state, 
rather than a “protection without accommodation” 
state, improves the precision of our estimates of β11 
(the effect of imposing a reasonable 
accommodations requirement), with little effect on 
their magnitudes.  Our estimates of β12 – β11 (the 
effect of imposing a traditional antidiscrimination 
provision) remain insignificant in all years. 
Texas  Remedy provisions refer to reasonable 
accommodations (Civ. Art. 5221k:6.01(d) and 
7.01(f)). 
Categorizing Texas as an “ADA-like” state, rather 
than a “protection without accommodation” state, 
does not alter the basic pattern of our results.  Our 
estimates of β11 (the effect of imposing a reasonable 
accommodations requirement) are somewhat 
smaller in magnitude and also somewhat less 
precise.  Our estimates of β12 – β11 (the effect of 
imposing a traditional antidiscrimination provision) 
remain insignificant in all years. 
Wisconsin  The Wisconsin legislature adopted a 
reasonable accommodations requirement in 
1981, but in the preceding period some 
Wisconsin lower courts judicially imposed a 
reasonable accommodations requirement (e.g., 
Teggatz v. Labor & Industry Review Comm’n, 
1978 WL 3436 (Cir. Ct. Wisc.)), while others 
did not impose such a requirement (e.g., 
Samens v. Labor & Industry Review Comm’n, 
1981 WL 11474 (Cir. Ct. Wisc.)). 
This change cannot affect our results (because the 
timing of state law adoption does not enter into our 










 -0.91 -0.84 -1.03 -1.08 -1.21 -1.34 -1.84 -2.64
(0.41) (0.55) (0.65) (0.60) (0.46) (0.51) (0.53) (0.51)
[0.57] [0.57] [0.63] [0.60] [0.53] [0.53] [0.56] [0.56]
-1.40 -0.29 -0.61 -1.33 -0.34 -1.02 -1.80 -2.42
(0.58) (0.57) (0.70) (1.08) (1.34) (1.02) (0.61) (0.59)
[0.77] [0.80] [0.74] [0.79] [1.05] [0.96] [0.62] [0.75]
1.23 1.67 0.51 -0.99 -1.92 -1.46 -1.23 -2.67
(0.63) (0.78) (0.51) (0.52) (0.49) (0.61) (0.70) (0.58)
[0.93] [0.96] [0.98] [0.88] [0.82] [0.92] [0.93] [0.88]
-0.90 -0.84 -0.99 -1.02 -1.12 -1.27 -1.79 -2.58
(0.33) (0.44) (0.53) (0.47) (0.32) (0.39) (0.37) (0.39)
[0.39] [0.46] [0.54] [0.47] [0.41] [0.42] [0.44] [0.40]
-1.43 -0.31 -0.63 -1.32 -0.30 -0.99 -1.74 -2.41
(0.29) (0.44) (0.65) (1.07) (1.40) (0.89) (0.46) (0.44)
[0.57] [0.69] [0.69] [0.80] [1.02] [0.96] [0.54] [0.63]
1.32 1.72 0.55 -0.96 -1.89 -1.41 -1.19 -2.68
(0.59) (0.72) (0.43) (0.48) (0.48) (0.58) (0.70) (0.50)
[0.44] [0.82] [0.80] [0.69] [0.67] [0.77] [0.79] [0.74]








ADA*DIS*AD and State, 
Year, and State*Year       
Fixed Effects
Table A3:  Basic Regression Results – Overall State-Group Effects






93-94 90-91 91-92 92-93
   
Notes:  Results duplicate the first two panels of Table 5 except that state-group effects are overall effects for each 
state group rather than effects in the "protection without accommodation" and "no protection" groups relative to 
"ADA-like" states.  ADA*DIS*AD replaces ADA*DIS in all regressions in this table.  The dependent variable is 
weeks worked per year.  The pre-ADA period is 1988-1989.  The post-ADA period is as stated.  Robust standard 
errors clustered on state-disability interactions are in parentheses below coefficient estimates, and robust standard 
errors clustered on state-disability-year interactions are in square brackets below coefficient estimates.  All 











 1.07 1.26 -0.06 -1.13 -1.84 -1.32 -1.02 -2.32
(0.55) (0.66) (0.42) (0.52) (0.51) (0.60) (0.72) (0.48)
[0.46] [0.51] [0.59] [0.50] [0.51] [0.56] [0.54] [0.50]
-2.10 -2.53 -1.74 -0.21 0.63 0.05 -0.72 0.00
(0.63) (0.64) (0.51) (0.62) (0.56) (0.69) (0.79) (0.58)
[0.53] [0.55] [0.67] [0.60] [0.59] [0.63] [0.62] [0.55]
-2.48 -1.65 -0.50 0.03 1.86 0.75 0.12 0.83
(0.63) (0.79) (0.82) (1.20) (1.44) (1.08) (0.83) (0.64)
[0.72] [0.80] [0.89] [0.90] [0.94] [1.01] [0.75] [0.77]
-0.38 0.89 1.24 0.24 1.23 0.70 0.84 0.83
(0.44) (0.60) (0.88) (1.14) (1.32) (0.88) (0.53) (0.47)
[0.61] [0.72] [0.85] [0.84] [0.85] [0.89] [0.61] [0.66]
-2.13 -2.52 -1.51 -0.08 0.70 0.12 -0.56 0.05
(0.69) (0.74) (0.70) (0.78) (0.69) (0.79) (0.89) (0.75)
[1.04] [1.03] [1.07] [1.03] [0.97] [1.05] [1.06] [0.98]
-2.66 -1.94 -1.14 -0.38 1.55 0.47 -0.62 0.19
(0.87) (0.94) (0.87) (1.23) (1.43) (1.19) (0.87) (0.69)
[1.18] [1.23] [1.14] [1.21] [1.36] [1.33] [1.09] [1.02]
-0.54 0.58 0.37 -0.30 0.85 0.35 -0.05 0.14
(0.71) (0.76) (0.96) (1.27) (1.39) (1.11) (0.81) (0.71)
[0.94] [0.95] [0.87] [1.04] [1.21] [1.11] [0.80] [0.76]
No. of Observations 292,562 291,149 286,796 283,860 274,988 265,866 266,478 266,838
97-98
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*NP – 
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*LP    
95-96 96-97
Specification with Year, 
Disabled, and Year*Disabled 
Fixed Effects
90-91 91-92 92-93 93-94 94-95
Table A4:  Alternative Fixed Effects Specifications
90-91 91-92 92-93 93-94 94-95 95-96 96-97 97-98







Coeff. on ADA*DIS*NP – 
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*LP    
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*LP
   
Notes:  The dependent variable is weeks worked per year.  The pre-ADA period is 1988-1989.  The post-ADA 
period is as stated.  Robust standard errors clustered on state-disability interactions are in parentheses below 
coefficient estimates, and robust standard errors clustered on state-disability-year interactions are in square 
brackets below coefficient estimates.  All regressions are OLS regressions, employ CPS survey weights, and 
include the fixed effects specified in the table.  Control variables are stated in Table 5.  In the upper panel of this 
table, the fixed effects preclude the estimation of the coefficients on ADA, LP, NP, ADA*LP, ADA*NP, DIS*LP, 
and DIS*NP from the basic specification in equation (1).  In the lower panel, the fixed effects preclude the 





 1.34 1.72 0.57 -0.98 -1.91 -1.41 -1.14 -2.44
(0.54) (0.57) (0.31) (0.46) (0.49) (0.59) (0.70) (0.44)
[0.75] [0.76] [0.76] [0.68] [0.68] [0.77] [0.78] [0.72]
-2.22 -2.56 -1.53 -0.08 0.73 0.13 -0.63 0.05
(0.63) (0.64) (0.51) (0.64) (0.58) (0.70) (0.77) (0.54)
[0.85] [0.85] [0.88] [0.81] [0.79] [0.87] [0.89] [0.81]
-2.77 -2.03 -1.20 -0.30 1.76 0.55 -0.34 0.65
(0.61) (0.72) (0.72) (1.16) (1.45) (1.00) (0.73) (0.48)
[0.95] [1.03] [1.03] [1.05] [1.20] [1.19] [0.89] [0.90]
-0.55 -0.53 0.34 -0.22 1.02 0.42 0.29 0.60
(0.43) (0.53) (0.76) (1.15) (1.40) (0.90) (0.42) (0.38)
[0.68] [0.78] [0.81] [0.91] [1.07] [1.00] [0.60] [0.66]
No. of Observations 292,562 291,149 286,796 283,860 274,988 265,866 266,478 266,838
0.32 0.93 0.06 -0.81 -1.56 -0.74 -1.05 -4.08
(1.02) (0.69) (0.57) (0.56) (0.49) (0.83) (0.98) (1.05)
[1.49] [1.06] [0.29] [0.23] [0.64] [0.28] [1.10] [1.36]
-1.33 -1.75 -1.78 -0.85 0.59 0.04 0.86 3.50
(1.26) (1.06) (1.17) (1.07) (0.99) (1.42) (1.52) (1.46)
[1.59] [1.18] [0.93] [1.29] [0.73] [0.85] [1.35] [1.49]
-1.68 -1.21 -0.69 -0.43 1.69 -0.05 -0.79 1.70
(1.18) (0.99) (0.90) (0.97) (1.03) (1.28) (1.01) (1.15)
[1.53) [1.17] [0.76] [1.07] [1.43] [0.83] [1.05] [1.33]
-0.35 0.54 1.09 0.42 1.10 -0.10 -1.64 -1.81
(0.94) (1.05) (1.22) (1.21) (1.30) (1.47) (1.29) (1.21)
[0.58] [0.65] [1.12] [1.64] [1.34] [1.13] [0.84] [0.72]
No. of Observations 41,793 41,786 41,157 40,813 39,169 37,612 37,832 37,593
Table A5:  Additional Robustness Checks
90-91 91-92 92-93 93-94 94-95 95-96 96-97 97-98







Coeff. on ADA*DIS*NP – 
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*LP    
Coeff. on ADA*DIS*NP – 





93-94 94-95 95-96 96-97
(2) Sample Includes Only 
Observations from   
Southern States
   
Notes:  The dependent variable is weeks worked per year.  The pre-ADA period is 1988-1989.  The post-ADA 
period is as stated.  Robust standard errors clustered on state-disability interactions are in parentheses below 
coefficient estimates, and robust standard errors clustered on state-disability-year interactions are in square 
brackets below coefficient estimates.  All regressions are OLS regressions, employ CPS survey weights, and 
include state, year, and state*year fixed effects.  Control variables are as stated in Table 5 minus state 
unemployment rate and the interaction of disability and state unemployment rate in the upper panel.  The southern 
states used in the lower panel are as stated in the text. 
 
 
 
 
 
 